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Abstract 
This  paper,  which  selectively  focuses  on  the  contested  concept  of  Corporate  Social 
Responsibility [CSR], forms part of a larger research project on the evolution of corporate 
governance. This research posits the evolution of corporate governance along three historical 
paradigms:  first,  the  economic/industrial  organization  paradigm,  second,  the  financial 
paradigm, and third, the knowledge paradigm. With regard to CSR, the paper explores the 
promises and shortcomings of the concept against the background of an evolutionary theory 
of corporate governance. The identification of three historical-conceptual paradigms allows 
us  to  trace  the  development  of  the  relation  between  a  general  discourse  on  corporate 
governance regulation [CGR] on the one hand and a more specialized, often polemic debate 
over corporate (social, environmental, human rights) responsibilities on the other. On the 
basis of the review of the three paradigms of CSR over the course of more than one hundred 
years, the paper concludes that there is no convincing justification to separate the general 
Corporate Governance from the more specific CSR discourse when assessing the nature of 
the corporation. Instead, it is argued that a more adequate understanding of what defines a 
corporation  is  gained  when  capturing  its  embedded  nature  in  a  continuously  changing 
domestic,  global  and  functional  environment.  Besides  being  both  a  legal  fiction  and  an 
economic actor, the business corporation is assuming a host of other roles in a functionally 
differentiated global society. The paper suggests that the generation and dissemination of 
knowledge, both internally and externally, has become the defining feature of the firm. The 
corporation  as  a  knowledge  actor  succeeds  the  prior  stages  of  assessing  it  as  a  private, 
political or financial actor, without however erasing these dimensions of the firm. In that, the 
history of the corporation – as concept and reality – shares important features with that of the 
state – as concept and as fact. 
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I. Introduction 
Reflections on Corporate Social Responsibility [CSR] in the midst of a large 
financial crisis are likely to have several starting and turning points. The current 
twists and turns of the financial markets dramatically put into perspective the 
religious  wars  fought  over  the  last  20  years  between  shareholder  value 
proponents and stakeholder capitalism defenders, carried out as a dispute over 
global  convergence  or  divergence  of  corporate  governance  standards.  The 
unprecedented expansion of global corporate finance
1 – most accentuated since 
the collapse of Communism –dramatically changed our entire perspective on 
the business corporation as it had been conceived both at the beginning of the 
century as well as during the aftermath of WW II in Western industrialized 
nations.  This  change  in  perspective  from  industrial,  embedded  capitalism  to 
financial capitalism tells a story about the way in which we attribute different 
categories  of  responsibilities  to  the  business  corporation.  While  we  are 
seemingly  well  acquainted  with  the  ‘classical’  segments  of  that  story,
2  its 
continuation is anything but clear. The history of corporate social responsibility 
as an ideal, concept, dream, ideology, or illusion is as intertwined in the larger 
political economy of capitalist development
3 as it has a particular idiosyncratic 
history of its own.
4 The following observations aim at illustrating this history. 
In search of adequate landmarks or milestones of this history, we find, on the 
one hand an overwhelming amount of conflicting contestations, viewpoints and 
programs. On the other, we find a much smaller number of greater frameworks, 
which seem to have provided a space of reference for a continuing negotiation 
of what can actually be meant by CSR. 
 
Such frameworks or, paradigms, provide the conceptual foundation on which a 
field is constituted – over a particular period of time, in a particular space, under 
particular  circumstances.  A  paradigm  is  exhausted  if  the  field  produces 
‘anomalies’ which cannot be explained with reference to the hitherto reigning 
paradigm.
5 This paper proposes to reflect on the history and on the prospects – 
of  CSR  through  the  study  of  its  evolution  by  focusing  on  three  larger 
paradigms. I will introduce these three paradigms as lenses through which we 
can perhaps better understand the never-ending quarrel about CSR after a short 
setting of the stage. The organizational-industrial paradigm of the Corporation, 
which in turn informs our understanding of CSR in this context and evolved 
over the first 75 years of the twentieth century with tremendous conceptual 
capacities,  views  the  corporation  as  a  battle-field  of  differing  concepts  of 
market intervention on the one hand and of the conflict over the appropriate role 
of  business  enterprises  and  the  scope  of  legal  regulation  of  business  in  the 
context of Keynesian economics and Welfare statism, on the other. Within the 
first  paradigm,  the  relevance  of  contested  ‘social  responsibilities’  of  the 
business  corporation  can  only  be  understood  when  seen  against  the  larger   2
background of a radically unfolding market economy
6, a critique of formal law
7 
and a deep-reaching deconstruction of political, legal and economic power.
8 For 
corporate law, this phase is marked by heated normative debates over the social 
status  of  business  corporations.  These  contestations  can  only  be  appreciated 
fully  when  seen  in  a  still  larger  context  of  social  theory.  The  rise  of  the 
interventionist  state  in  France  and  Germany,  the  full-blown  turn  to 
instrumentalize law as a tool of social engineering during the U.S. New Deal 
and the widespread emergence of an ambitious regulatory state apparatus in 
Western democracies
9 provides the context for the ideological fight over the 
public or private nature of the corporation. 
 
This period of the ‘social’ is succeeded, within legal and social theory, by an 
amalgamation  of  competing  assessments  of  the  social  structure.
10  In  the 
comparably confined field of corporate theory, the second, financial paradigm 
of the corporation shifts the focus from management’s balancing of competing 
societal interests towards a fundamental transformation of the corporation into 
an  investment  vehicle  whose  success  is  measured  almost  exclusively  with 
reference to its returns to stockholders. In a context, which was until recently 
marked  by  the  wide  availability  of  finance  on  a  global  basis  that  was 
accompanied by and in turn fuelled a fierce competition for such funds, the firm 
had  become  a  vehicle  for  strategic  investment  placements,  a  development 
increasingly complemented by the relinquishing of its role as an organizational 
laboratory for market governance contestation. Since 1980, the financialization 
of  the  corporation  has  led  to  a  widely  held  acceptance  of  subjecting  every 
element of a business firm to varied processes of securitization
11, involving a 
fast proliferating landscape of investment actors.
12 This strategy, pursued by 
companies across the world, is pursued to attract a highly diversified investment 
of  global  investment  pools.  Far-reaching  deregulation  with  regard  to  capital 
control during the 1980s has facilitated an unprecedented flow of capital across 
national boundaries, allowing for securitizations, often repeatedly, of a large 
number of assets, including pension claims, real estate and commercial claims. 
With companies designing corporate strategy primarily with stock performance 
in  mind,  shareholder  value  became  the  dominating  principle  in  assessing 
corporate  performance,  fuelled  by  a  seemingly  unstoppable  growth  in  index 
values.  Yet,  the  pressure  brought  about  by  the  credit  crisis,  constantly 
aggravating since 2005, but globally exploding in mid-late 2008, suggests the 
transition towards another paradigm. 
 
The  first  two  paradigms  are  telling  of  the  particular  political  economy 
constellations that provided the context for the distinct relationships political 
regulators were striking between individual freedom on the one hand and the 
political-legal promotion of the public good on the other. In the center of the   3
first  paradigm  stood  the  manager,
13  losing  his  decisive  authority  under  the 
second paradigm. Characterizing the financial paradigm, Ronald Dore, writes 
‘In today’s investor capitalism, American managers are less autonomous. They 
operate  under  the  close  surveillance  of  a  board  of  directors  who  represent 




The new, emerging knowledge paradigm seems to move even more radically 
beyond  this  Polanyian  framework  of  a  double  movement,  at  the  same  time 
assigning  an  entirely  new  role  to  corporate  management.  The  Knowledge 
paradigm suggests that a corporation has become such a complex entity that we 
must combine an inside with an outside view of the firm to adequately assess its 
functions,  performances  and  responsibilities.
15  In  light  of  the  dramatically 
changed  socio-economic  functions  of  the  corporation  in  an  era  of 
transnationalization  and  privatisation  any  sustainable  trajectory  for  a 
corporation’s  social  and  other  responsibilities  must  build  on  an  adequate 
assessment of a corporation’s environment. The knowledge paradigm points to 
a fundamental transformation of what corporate management does
16 and how 
the  law  sanctifies  or  sanctions  its  actions.  Our  interest  in  the  knowledge 
paradigm as applied to the corporation is motivated by the assumption that, 
under conditions of the continuing radical transformation of the institutional and 
normative  environment  of  post-Keynesian  economics  and  post-Welfare  state 
governance, future attention has to be directed to both corporations and the state 
as emblematic representations of this changing environment. 
 
2. The Death of Contract and the Rise of Finance 
For almost a century the quest into the nature of the firm had been determined 
by the negotiation of competing social interests. These were institutionalised 
along very different patterns in capitalist countries around the world. In Western 
Europe as well as the U.S. until the 1920s, there was a strongly discernable 
nexus between industrial expansion and welfare politics, in many cases driven 
by  large  corporate  actors.  Starting  with  the  emergence  of  the  ‘Speculation 
Economy’ in the third decade of the twentieth century,
17 the role of finance 
became increasingly important in the organization and regulation of business 
corporations. In Western Europe, the consolidation of corporate power saw a 
lesser degree of corporate capture of government powers. Embedded in a tightly 
regulated system of company, employment and social welfare law, the business 
corporation remained the anchor point for an ongoing assessment of private 
power in a fast unfolding market society.
18 The negotiation of the status and 
role of the business corporation formed an integral part of Western political 
economy’s self-inspection. 
   4
2.1. Corporations and Finance 
For lawyers, in particular in private law, this situation presented a formidable 
opportunity to reflect on the nature of legal regulation of the market.
19 The next, 
obvious step was to understand a critical assessment of the role of law in the 
context of political market intervention as only one example of a much more 
fundamental analysis of law as such. Beginning with a critical deconstruction of 
the legal arguments pertaining to the autonomy of the firm
20 to the continuing 
dispute over a corporation’s ownership and control questions,
21 sociologists of 
law suggested a radical examination of the relation between law and facts, law 
and social reality.
22 In this rich context, the business corporation first became 
subject of intensive legal analysis and social theory critique.
23 In light of the 
fast-evolving and expanding market society at the turn of the century, the legal 
imagination of corporate organization was distinctly political. Eventually, with 
the ‘prairie fire’ of law & economics
24, spreading in the late 1960s to revive 
Ronald  Coase’s  theorem  of  the  firm’s  economic  primacy  over  market 
contracting
25,  the  business  corporation  seemed  to  recede  again  into  the 
amorphous, purportedly apolitical realm of the market, itself conceived as a 
sphere of private agreement, rational profit seeking and economic efficiency. In 
historiographical perspective, the life of the corporation as a public, political 
actor,
26 was of short duration. 
 
Of  equally  confined  nature  was  the  time-horizon  against  we  subsequently 
learned to measure the success of a firm: with stock performance becoming the 
sole  determinant  of  a  company’s  value,  it  became  increasingly  difficult  to 
represent other aspects of a corporation. The focus on short-time volatility of 
corporate shares to evaluate a company’s merits and prospects would quickly 
become the only perspective from which we would try to understand a firm.
27 
But this narrowing of gaze came at the price of also blinding out that the firm’s 
environment  had  dramatically  been  transformed  over  the  course  of  a  few 
decades. To the degree that the advancement of communication and information 
technology revolutionized the transfer of derivatives, sometimes as a company’s 
virtual  assets,  across  vast  strategic  spaces,  the  attention  given  to  stock 
performance eventually removed the firm from its geographical environment by 
elevating it into a purely ethereal realm. In consequence of its financialization, 
the  share  or  other  security  of  the  corporation  (its  ‘reference  asset’  for  the 
creation  of  another  synthetic  security)  became  radically  virtualised.  What 
architects of synthetic credit instruments call the reference asset, which can be 
the original subject of a loan or security, became radically virtualised in relation 
to  the  business  corporation.  The  corporation,  in  turn,  was  reduced  to  an 
anchoring  point  for  independently  originated  financial  programs,  thereby 
positioning the corporation no longer in a real economy, but in an artificial 
space of financial engineering.   5
 
In the end the firm as we have come to understand it over the past 20 years, had 
even  outgrown  even  the  ideal  model  of  a  nexus  of  contracts.
28  In  order  to 
remain operational, the model had to be adapted to the processes of financial 
engineering, which – at least partially – moved the corporation out of the centre 
of the labyrinth of contracts in which it, or its securities, are entangled. The 
financialization of the corporation and its securities entailed a radical separation 
of the corporation itself from the instruments that represent claims in, of, or 
against  the  corporation.  The  corporation  had  become  a  nodal  point  for  an 
ephemeral  crossing,  interlinking  and  overlapping  of  financial  vectors, 
channelled through the glass structure of the legal person, with almost to no 
relation to the original ‘business’ of the corporation. A dream fulfilled, with 
money flowing in and out of the firm, the corporation had become a virtual 
realm for strategic investment. 
 
The financialization of corporate governance is powerfully reflected in the fast 
rise in importance of financial experts in the board of directors, the importance 
of financial expertise in the making of business decisions and, finally, in the 
transformation of the educational environment for the supporting professions – 
including lawyers, consultancies and accountants. The flip-side of this is the 
dramatic erosion of labour interests representation in the contemporary business 
corporation. Where corporate activity had for a long time been marked by a 
lively  public  political  discussion  of  different  constituencies’  interests  in  the 
firm, its financial and physical virtualization
29 increasingly erased the reference 
points for a general assessment of what corporations were doing. 
 
 
2.2 Transformations of Capitalism and the Law 
This  context  is  of  crucial  importance  for  any  inquiry  into  the  prospects  of 
Corporate Social Responsibility. One of the reasons for the dismal history of 
CSR must be seen in the disjuncture between the by-then-attained complexity 
of  corporate  activity  on  the  one  hand  and  the  comparably  crude  regulatory 
attempts with regard to the corporation and its financialization, on the other,
30 
which characterized the larger part of the twentieth century. As the contestation 
of the firm and the inquiry into its duties and obligations continued, decade after 
decade,  along  over-simplified  and  yet  politically  and  normatively  highly 
charged dividing lines
31, there were but few attempts at stepping back from the 
lines of attack to take a fresh perspective on what a business corporation is all 
about.
32 Too immersed into the evolving environment of industrial capitalism 
were all observers of the firm to recognize it as anything else than a vehicle of 
wealth-enhancing,  general  social  progress.  In  the  heated  dispute  between 
‘shareholder value’ and ‘stakeholder capitalism’, in particular in light of the   6
self-proclaimed triumph of the former as representing the ‘end of history in 
corporate law’,
33 those who purported to hold on to a system of an embedded 
system of corporate governance
34 thus long remained on the losing side of the 
argument. In this context, most of the arguments pointing to the political nature 
of the firm as a public or quasi-public actor in a world of privatization, growing 
corporate influence in public-private infrastructure development and the market 
principle-driven organization and maintenance of formerly public services were 
never seen to carry much weight, given the soberingly amorphous nature of the 
political economy in general.
35 With the state, seen domestically, in a strange 
to-and-fro between retreat and re-regulation and, perceived globally, as trying to 
expand its regulatory reach towards actors and processes that had long been 
powerfully unfolding in the transnational space,
36 the long-recognized anchor-
point  for  a  political  theory  of  the  firm  was  lost  –  and  with  it  the  place  of 
corporate governance within a larger project of critical regulatory inquiry.
37  
 
2.3 Crisis – what Crisis? 
In  October  2008,  much  of  this  debate  appears  in  a  different  light,  with 
exorbitant  values  being  ‘wiped  out’  –  as  the  stock  market  talk  goes  –  at 
breathtaking speed.
38 At the end of September 2008 the drama of a Federal 
Bailout program in the United States progressed on a breath-taking course, and 
its outcome is anything but clear.
39 With each passing day, the hopes that the 
$700 billion injection would have a real effect, become dimmer. At the same 
time, the global dimensions of the credit crisis become clearer and attempts to 
address the crisis are being undertaken on a global level. 
 
Yet,  it  is  all  too  obvious  that  this  extreme  value  destruction  speaks  to  the 
similarly overwhelming, ‘irrationally exuberant’
40 creation of value that marked 
the last two decades, albeit with some momentary interruptions.
41 In light of the 
securitization  mania,  which  George  Soros  scandalized  in  his  most  recent 
book
42, the long emerging impression that we were witnessing an irrevocable, 
fundamental shift from industrial to financial capitalism appears questionable 
now. A host of rescue teams is waiting on the sideline, but where are these 
suggestions directing us? Polanyi’s return?
43 What would have appeared, just a 
few  years  ago,  as  an  at  best  inopportune  attempt  at  applying  a  purportedly 
outdated  political  economy  approach  to  a  host  of  economic  processes  that 
seemed  to  defy  political  regulation  in  the  name  of  a  boastingly  triumphant 
market fundamentalism, might today be able to critically inform a disparaged 
discourse over the future of financial market regulation. The latter is intricately 
intertwined  with  corporate  governance,  and  thus  intimately  tied  to  any 
discussion of CSR. It is against this background, that today’s search into the 
soul of the market and the company is unfolding.  
   7
2.4 Re-embedding Capitalism? 
Hence, the suggestion to take three points of departure for a new look at the 
idea  and  concept  of  corporate  social  responsibility.  By  proposing  three 
paradigms that can structure and explain the evolution of our thinking of CSR, I 
hope  to  illustrate  the  above-alluded  to  connections  between  the  triadic 
regulation of finance, corporate governance and labor. CSR cannot be assessed 
without taking this constellation as one of several cornerstones for a theory of 
the firm. With this regulatory trias evolving in different political economies 
through  history,  we  will  see  how  the  identification  of  different  regulatory 
challenges  is  inevitably  always  a  child  of  its  time.  The  deafening  noise  of 
political  contestation  is  likely  to  repeatedly  point  our  attention  to  ‘usual’ 
suspects of interest carriers in and around the business corporation, managers, 
investors, unions, employees, creditors, the infamous ‘society at large’. Despite 
the  embeddedness  of  the  business  corporation  in  historically  evolved  socio-
economic contexts, it simultaneously lives in other worlds as well. The political 
economy of the firm is not all there is to its persisting regulatory conundrum as 
long  as  our  analytical  lens  (‘political  economy’)  can  only  perceive  the 
corporation as either a ‘legal personality’ or as a ‘real’ actor to which it then 
assesses attributes such as ‘private’, ‘quasi-public’, ‘political’, or ‘hybrid’. Both 
perspectives  –  the  legal  and  a  crude,  sociological  one  –  that  merge  in  the 
political  economy  approach,  must  be  enlarged:  the  legal  perspective  must 
incorporate its greatest challenge, namely all that which is not law. Within the 
legal  system,  this  suggests  a  burning  tension  between  legal/illegal  and  non-
legal.
44 From that perspective, the concept of the corporation as a legal person 
must be deconstructed in order to question the relation between the legal and 
non-legal norms that govern corporate behavior. In light of the fast growing 
body  of  self-regulatory  norms,  such  an  inquiry  seems  more  than  warranted. 
Second,  with  regard  to  the  sociological  struggle  over  naming  the  corporate 
beast, it seems no longer plausible to apply terms (private, public, political) and 
derivations  thereof  (quasi-public,  hybrid)  to  describe  entities,  that  seem  to 
evolve in defiance of traditional concepts used to describe the relations between 
the state and the market. After a Realist/legal-sociological destruction of the 
allegedly apolitical, non-legal nature of the ‘market’
45 on the one hand and the 
evolving paradigm  of the knowledge society in sociological thinking on the 
other,
46 we need to turn our attention to that which lies beyond the traditional 
political economy approach. At the end of our present inquiry, we shall see how 
the last paradigm, which purports to reformulate corporate social responsibility 
as a general theory of corporate function in a knowledge society is at this time 
the least concretely defined one. It is a concept in evolution, and still crucially 
experimental. And yet, a cursory study of the preceding two paradigms, the 
organizational-industrial  and  the  financial  one,  will  illuminate  a  trajectory,   8
which records the first two paradigms as epochs in an evolutionary, open-ended 
development. 
 
3. Industrial Organization and Corporate Governance (Paradigm 1) 
The study of the first paradigm is fairly straight forward. It includes a revisiting 
of  the  well-known  dialectics  between  mainstream  corporate  governance  and 
CSR promoters. Let us call this paradigm the ‘Organizational-Industrial or, the 
Economic Paradigm’. From this conceptual viewpoint, the dispute is one about 
conflicting ordering values for political economy models. It is here, where a 
comparative perspective is of crucial importance
47 in light of the fact that CSR 
discourses form part of highly path-dependent, historically evolving and socio-
culturally defined negotiations over the role of business in society.
48 
 
Given  this  complex  landscape,  no  wonder  that  any  attempt  to  draw  up  a 
comprehensive  map  is  faced  with  considerable  obstacles.  Like  a  red  thread 
running through the 20
th century’s history of CSR we see the eternal negotiation 
and renegotiation of the rights and duties that structure the relation between a 
company and its employees.
49 This history reaches back, in fact, deep into the 
19
th century: already in the 1800s the negotiation of workers’ rights suggested 
the  conceptualisation  of  holistic  concepts  of  workers’  workplace  and 
employment  relations,  expanding  from  the  contract  of  employment  to  the 
establishment of supporting institutions,
50 albeit with considerable variations.
51  
 
3.1 The Corporation and its Stakeholders 
These fragments can be seen as early representations of later institutionalised 
prominent  elements  of  the  employee-company  relation,  for  example  in 
Germany,
52 but also in France
53 and Italy. With significant differences between 
various  national  economies,  the  institutionalisation  of  worker  rights  took 
distinct  forms,  allowing  economists  and  social  scientists  to  study  these 
differences  through  the  lens  of  ‘varieties  of  capitalism’.
54  The  comparative 
historical  narrative  of  these  varieties  became,  over  the  course  of  the  20
th 
century, a crucial element in an increasingly global discourse over the most 
competitive national economy. As markets continued to follow the course of 
disembeddedness that had so powerfully been described by Karl Polanyi in the 
1940s
55, the regulation of business enterprises fast became a strategic token in 
the global race for resources. With corporations being increasingly able to take 
their domestic regulators hostage by threatening to take their business elsewhere 
in search of a more supporting regulatory environment, governments soon had 
to  recognize  that  their  approach  to  corporate  governance  regulation  was 
inseparable from its policies in the areas of taxation, employment law, social 
insurance  law,  industrial  relations  and,  eventually,  environmental  law.  From 
this perspective, company law regulation became to be recognized as an integral   9
part of a government’s politics of market regulation. But, to the degree to which 
this realization rendered regulators more sensitive – and humble – with regard 
to  the  fragile  constitution  of  a  complex  regulatory  field,  governments  also 
became painfully aware of the limits of their interventions. 
 
In  this  context,  CSR  was  deeply  entangled  in  the  right-left  negotiations  of 
which directions political regulation of this comprehensive field of corporate 
governance  was  to  take.
56  At  the  core  of  this  negotiation  was  the  tension 
between the firm as a real, economic, social entity on the one hand and a legal 
person on the other. Reaching back deep into the social philosophies of the 19
th 
century,  the  negotiation  of  the  nature  of  the  corporation  presented  an 
opportunity to revisit and contest the evolving nature of a country’s political 
economy.
57 The high point of this inspection was the early 20
th century dispute 
over the duties of management. It was clear to all that what was at stake was 
nothing less than a political theory of the business corporation. Yet, with the 
dramatic expansion of the market and the crucial role of the firm within it, the 
political  nature  of  the  business  corporation  became  re-channelled  into  a 
assessment over how much else the corporation should be doing with regard to 
protecting a wider range of interests: as a result, a new dispute opened up that 
would,  as  we  know,  tragically  shift  the  focus  away  from  the  firm  as  such 
towards a firm with considerable philanthropic duties. Early litigation tells a 
fascinating story of these changing shifts in perspective.
58 
 
3.2 The Corporation in a Welfarist ‘Mixed Economy’ 
Against  the  background  of  the  expanding  regulatory  and  welfare  state  in 
Western  states,  CSR  experienced  an  important  revitalisation  and  further 
consolidation in the second half of the 20
th century. As the state continued to 
reach deeper and deeper into every corner of society, corporations consolidated 
their role as vitally important actors in the fast-progressing ‘mixed economy’ 
that had already taken its beginnings – as regards certain industries – in the mid-
19
th  century
59  and  that  would  become  characteristic  of  political  economy
60, 
where  corporations  played  a  pivotal  part  in  the  state’s  pursuit  of  full 
employment, universal education and health care. 
 
At  the  same  time,  the  concept  of  a  mixed  economy  remained  anything  but 
uncontested.
61 It was clear that its mobilization constituted an invitation, if not a 
provocation to either critically assess the relation between state and market or to 
deconstruct the allegedly neutral role of the state and the ‘private’ nature of the 
market. One illustration of this unresolved, dormant dispute was the lingering 
doctrinal and conceptual ambiguity surrounding legal regulatory fields such as 
‘economic’ or ‘social’ law.
62 The contested categorization of different fields to 
belong to either ‘private’ or ‘public’ law could either be seen as a significant   10 
(or, bizarre) manifestation of civil law private lawyers’ obsession with formal-
doctrinal distinctions, or as a far-reaching critique of the unquestioned political 
normative foundations of legal regulation.
63 
 
Despite this, the next period was marked by a number of noteworthy highpoints 
in the polemical debate over the scope of a company’s obligations and duties ‘to 
society’.
64 Let us briefly turn our attention to the famous, infamous utterance by 
Milton Friedman, which since then has haunted CSR proponents: In response to 
the  question,  ‘What  does  it  mean  to  say  that  the  corporate  executive  has  a 
‘social responsibility’ in his capacity as businessman?’, Friedman answered
65: 
‘If this statement is not pure rhetoric, it must mean that he is to act 
in  some  way  that  is  not  in  the  interest  of  his  employers.  For 
example,  that  he  is  to  refrain  from  increasing  the  price  of  the 
product in order to contribute to the social objective of preventing 
inflation,  even  though  a  price  increase  would  be  in  the  best 
interests of the corporation. Or that he is to make expenditures on 
reducing pollution beyond the amount that is in the best interests of 
the corporation or that is required by law in order to contribute to 
the social objective of improving the environment. Or that, at the 
expense of corporate profits, he is to hire ‘hardcore’ unemployed 
instead of better-qualified available workmen to contribute to the 
social objective of reducing poverty.’ […] 
‘In each of these cases, the corporate executive would be spending 
someone else’s money for a general social interest. Insofar as his 
actions in accord with his ‘social responsibility’ reduce returns to 
stockholders,  he  is spending  their  money.  Insofar  as  his  actions 
raise the price to customers, he is spending the customers’ money. 
Insofar as his actions lower the wages of some employees, he is 
spending their money.’ […] 
Friedman concluded: 
‘The difficulty of exercising ‘social responsibility’ illustrates, of 
course, the great virtue of private competitive enterprise -- it forces 
people to be responsible for their own actions and makes it difficult 
for them to ‘exploit’ other people for either selfish or unselfish 
purposes. They can do good -- but only at their own expense.’ 
The  central  point  for  our  purposes  is  Friedman’s  distinction  between  the 
responsibilities of an individual and a corporation. He asks: ‘What does it mean   11 
to  say  that  ‘business’  has  responsibilities?  Only  people  can  have 
responsibilities. A corporation is an artificial person and in this sense may have 
artificial  responsibilities,  but  ‘business’  as  a  whole  cannot  be  said  to  have 
responsibilities,  even  in  this  vague  sense.  The  first  step  toward  clarity  in 
examining the doctrine of the social responsibility of business is to ask precisely 
what it implies for whom.’ 
 
The powerless critique of business made by proponents of CSR can be seen in 
their inability to effectively counter this argument. And, against the background 
of the late 19
th, early 20
th century political economy with the creation of the 
corporation in law as legal person, this would have been relatively obvious: 
Friedman’s refutation of any attempt to attribute general social obligations to 
the business firm is grounded in the idea that a corporation is a physical entity, 
created and structured through a series of private agreements among individual 
business  people.  Attributing  a  general  social  responsibility  to  a  corporate 
manager would, in Friedman’s view, constitute both an unwarranted expansion 
of  his  duties  and  a  non-permissible  violation  of  management’s  duties  to  its 
employers – that is the firm’s shareholders. Friedman comes dangerously close 
to  a  recognition  of  the  firm’s  legally  constructed  artificial  reality  when 
comparing a manager to a civil servant. Friedman here suggests that were a 
manager to be likened to a civil servant, which would inevitably include an 
assignment of additional and different duties, then there ought to be, for starters, 
a different appointment or election process. It is here where Friedman not only 
recognizes the concept of the legal person, but he is effectively exploiting it, 
implying that it is in the prerogative of the legislator to change these ground 
rules. But, as long as they remain in place, it is not in the purview of judges (or 
scholars) to arbitrarily expand the existing range of obligations. 
 
It is too obvious to see how this argument goes in circles, but it does and has 
been doing so very effectively. At the heart of this is that management’s duty 
exhausted  itself  in  meeting  shareholders’  demands.  This  merely  includes 
another conundrum, namely what shareholder interests are. Such an assessment 
can simply not be made in the abstract. This is the most important lesson from 
the  recent  revisiting  of  Berle  and  Means’  1932  book  and  the  much-needed 
project to re-embed the book in the contemporary political economy in order to 
undermine the mainstream narrative that has been seeking to use their book as a 
vanguard publication for a shareholder value maximization program.
66 The first 
paradigm  for  CSR,  which  embeds  its  concept  and  idea  in  a  larger  political 
economy has, in the end, to run dry, because it cannot effectively penetrate the 
black box of corporate law regulation, which remains sealed with a thick layer 
of inconclusive statements over duties and obligations. The crux has been the 
following:  on  the  one  hand,  the  corporation  is  perceived  as  a  contractual   12 
arrangement  through  which  it  channels  its  own  and  so-called  ‘residual’ 
interests.
67 On the other hand, the corporation is rightly perceived as a legal 
person, that is, the corporation is the result of an artificial construction, which 
shields the owners from the corporation’s creditors.
68 As such, however, it is the 
subject  of  legal  construction,  regulation  and  interpretation.  Put  bluntly,  the 
corporation as a legal framework exists but through authority of the law, and it 
is  through  law  that  the  conflict  between  distance  and  care,  between  public 
intervention and private autonomy is constantly being renegotiated. The firm 
becomes  the  laboratory,  in  which  Polanyi’s  double  movement  of  market 
liberalization  and  market  control  is  seemingly  inescabably  intertwined. 
Certainly, this does not in any way solve the problem how to negotiate the 
principle  of  private  autonomy  and  legal  construction  within  the  company, 
unless  one  chooses  to  collapse  the  distinction  between  the  allegedly  private 
sphere of contractual arrangements here and political intervention there. This 
move is well known and has been made again and again throughout the 20
th 
century.
69 But, because it reengages the concept of the corporation in a debate 
which  is  at  once  legal,  political  and  moral,  this  debate  is  necessarily  open-
ended. It would already be an advance to view CSR as reflective of this open-
ended dispute, not as its solution.  
 
3.3 Beyond Right and Left? 
As we will see in the following section, the political economy paradigm, as 
unfolded  up  to  here,  has  been  seriously  undermined  and  relativized  by  the 
increasing disempowerment of the invested interest parties in the corporation. 
The degree to which the received nexus-of-contracts model fails to explain the 
financial  flows,  subdivisions  and  reshapings  of  business  corporations  today 
reflects on the differentiation of the corporate form. As the modern business 
corporation  becomes,  on  the  one  hand,  the  intersection  for  strategic 
investments, and, on the other, a dramatically decentralized, ‘networked’ firm,
70 
its traditional organizational structure begins to dissolve. We are only beginning 
to understand the consequences this has for our analytical apparatus. As regards 
the  former,  the  dramatic  rise  of  financial  instruments,  special  investment 
vehicles and funds suggests a far-reaching erosion of the traditional, publicly 
held stock corporation. The eroding effect this has on the interest pluralism 
concept of the corporation, even with its iterations of a mixed, hybrid, quasi-
political actor, is exacerbated by the networked firm, which continues to pose 
formidable  challenges  for  traditional  political  economy  concepts  of  the 
corporation and its stakeholders.
71 
 
We are increasingly facing the dilemma of having to describe a fast-evolving, 
complex structure without having the appropriate vocabulary available. In light 
of  the  political  economy  perspective  described  above,  the  combination  of  a   13 
sophisticated, critical legal perspective and a yearning sociological description 
seems to be all we have at our disposition. The promise of trying to rescue the 
political  economy  perspective  into  the  next  evolutionary,  more  radically 
financial phase of corporate organization, is that we might be able to translate 
our inquiry over the meaning of public and private in corporate law into an 
adequately critically agenda for the corporation in an era of financial capitalism. 
The danger of studying the corporation through the lens of political economy is 
that we are likely to apply the same distinctions as we used to, without however, 
being able to develop them against the former political, regulatory and socio-
economic framework. While early critics of legal formality with regard to the 
corporation believed in the validity of re-politicization
72, this is anything but 
certain today. For one, the institutional framework of political market regulation 
has  been  undergoing  dramatic  changes,  effectively  eroding  the  demarcation 
lines  between  the  market  and  the  political  spheres.
73  While  we,  in  critical 
tradition, might want to continue to discredit the validity of these boundaries in 
the first place, there is another element which seriously challenges the critical 
project:  the  transnationalization  of  legal  regulation  leads  to  a  complex  co-
existence of legal and non-legal forms of governance and self-regulation. With 
the  de-territorialization  of  societal  activities  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
proliferation of norm-entrepreneurs designing norms and regulatory regimes for 
these cross-jurisdictional spaces of societal activity on the other, the space of 
political action is being redefined.
74 With law having become unearthed, the 
survival chances of a nation-based concept of legal regulation have become 
uncertain.
75 With this in mind, it is questionable whether a political economy 
perspective can help us understand today’s regulatory challenges with regard to 
the complex forms of the corporation. 
 
As  we  will  see  when  discussing  the  next  paradigm,  the  relegation  of  the 
political economy perspective is not a viable option when trying to understand 
the particular position of CSR in a web of transnationalized legal, economic, 
social and political rationalities. While not offering a relief from the ambiguous 
role  of  CSR  in  the  larger  context  of  capitalist  organization,  the  political 
economy  paradigm  nevertheless  helps  to  become  adequately  sensitive  when 
assessing the complex landscape of corporate governance regulation today. But, 
as we will see, the political economy perspective’s endorsement of a categorical 
distinction of economy and society prevents it from adequately registering the 
economy as one function system of society.
76 
 
4. What Comes After Financial Capitalism? (Paradigm 2) 
Let  us  now  turn  to  a  brief  examination  of  the  second,  already  alluded  to 
financial paradigm for CSR. It provides for a different perspective by focusing 
on CSR as an integral element of any business decision taken by corporate   14 
management.  Given  the  emphasis  on  the  financial  strategies  that  business 
corporations have been pursuing on global markets over the past, ‘The Financial 
Paradigm’ offers important insights into the way in which the corporation has 
been  transformed  from  a  fairly  straightforward  investment,  production  and 
dissemination  vehicle  into  a  complex  amalgamation  of  financial  strategies, 
consuming every corporate asset and interest. 
 
One element of this transformation is that financial decisions in the past have 
been driven almost exclusively with a short-term orientation in mind, as regards 
the maximization of shareholder value in response to highly volatile investor 
constituencies who, at any time, could ‘take their money elsewhere’. In this 
light,  the  Financial  Sustainability  Paradigm,  however,  already  points  to 
precisely that, which the strategies pursued by corporate management over the 
last two decades – in most cases – were not. Instead, our second paradigm shall 
help us better understand how strategies of corporate governance and corporate 
finance are intricately interlinked and intertwined. The meaning of the second 
paradigm is, hence, not to promote a return to a pre-financial capitalism model 
of  corporate  organization,  but,  instead,  to  embrace  the  potential  of  a  highly 
diversified  knowledge  economy,  which  bears  substantial  potential  to  better 
synergize governance and finance strategies in a sustainable way. 
 
The other element of the financial corporation as the key player in the transition 
from industrial to financial capitalism is the degree to which the claims held by 
various  stakeholders  of  the  firm  against  the  corporation  become  themselves 
commodified. This is most discernible with regard to the dramatic expansion of 
financial  instruments  consuming  all  of  a  corporation’s  inside  and  outside 
relations.  
 
The degree to which the narrative of a transition from industrial to financial 
capitalism is replete with paradoxes, similar to those we identified under the 
first political economy paradigm, becomes obvious when we turn our attention 
to the evidence given in its support. Readers of the recent ‘Special Report on 
Globalisation’ in The Economist
77 might have been struck by the display of 
complexity  that  appears  to  mark  the  contemporary  wave  of  economic 
globalisation. From the various accounts covered in the Report, it seems clear 
that the continuing, undeterred rise of emerging market companies to economic 
success is likely only the tip of an iceberg of an indeed extremely multi-faceted 
story of marketisation and global expansion. 
 
With consultancy firms putting in hundreds of extra hours and experts to stay 
informed  on  the  rapid  developments  in  the  BRIC  economy,
78  worldwide 
attention  is  turning  to  the  analysis  of  market  strategy,  multinational  (inter-  15 
cultural) management theory and the role of government in the economy. This 
interest in the global market is fuelled further by the dramatic developments in 
the global finance sector in 2008.
79 These developments are – as we speak – 
continuing to grow into most dramatic proportions, and the repercussions are 
anything but clear. Surely, they are not promising. While the world markets are 
being  reshaped  by  emerging  economies’  multinational  companies  that  are 
powerfully contesting the stronghold of Western world companies, the biggest 
erosion  of  the  financial  markets  since  the  Great  Depression,
80  perhaps  ever, 
drives a deep wedge into the architecture of financial capitalism that has been 
growing  out  of  the  structures  of  the  mid-20
th  century  industrial  and  post-
industrial  market  systems  over  the  past  one  or  two  decades.  The  present 
attempts, worldwide, to effectively address the current crisis, suggest a much 
greater need to really understand the origins of this crisis. Coupled with the now 
fast emerging ‘explanations of how we got here’ are the usual ‘I told you so’s’, 
but all of these assertions continue to leave a somewhat bitter feeling that this 
surely cannot be all that is to it. And that is not only prompted by the sheer 
dramatic  dimensions  of  the  present  financial  fall-out  and  the  corresponding 
political responses.
81 At the heart of the financialization paradigm we find the 
unresolved  issue  of  how  the  financial  concept  of  the  firm  relates  to  the 
organizational one. The problem here is the apparent amnesia of the promoters 
of  a  financialization  of  corporate  governance  with  regard  to  the  unresolved 
problems of the organizational concept of corporate governance, which stood at 
the centre of the political economy paradigm. Mistaking the past history for a 
closed  chapter,  the  recent  defences  of  a  financial  theory  of  the  corporation 
failed to acknowledge how a different angle from which to describe the firm on 
its own does not provide a response to the remaining unanswered questions. 
 
Today, much suggests that we are standing at the brink of moving beyond the 
financialization paradigm. As the uneasiness grows that, deep down, the dark 
sides of the concept of financial capitalism have been neglected in favor of 
exploiting  the  globalization,  mobility  and  expansion  theory  of  corporate 
governance,
82 the question of what comes next appears nothing but daunting.  
 
What is the place of CSR in this discourse of transition? Seemingly, CSR has 
little to say, being still so embedded in the contrasting paradigm of right vs left 
corporate politics. Yet, this should not blind us to recognize that CSR is an 
integral part of the current rethinking of what corporations owe to society. The 
financialization  of  corporate  governance  is  in  many  ways  more  fact  than 
program  today  and  this,  in  turn,  has  clear  implications  for  CSR.  CSR  must 
embrace the expanded reach of management decision-making challenges and 
contribute to a concretisation of these duties beyond the former proclamation 
that the corporation has a responsibility towards society at large. At this stage of   16 
the development, the challenge is to reformulate CSR to encompass the most 
advanced forms of corporate finance through which the firm becomes part of a 
global  web  of  financially  interlinked  financial  instruments.  From  this 
perspective, CSR moves beyond the philanthropic confinements of its previous 
iterations, while not betraying its political economy origins. Rather, by taking 
these  seriously,  a  timely  CSR  agenda  must  today  build  on  the  changed 
environment  of  organizational  and  financial  architectures  when  formulating 
policies. It is here, where CSR meets SRI and many other pertinent forms of 
bringing ‘social’ considerations to bear upon corporate decision-making. Only 
to  the  degree  that  CSR  is  able  to  think  outside  of  the  corporate  box  and 
transform itself into a functionally driven perspective from which to perceive 
emerging  forms  of  corporate  activity,  investment,  risk  diversification  and 
securitization, will CSR have anything to say in this problematic time. 
 
5. What Managers (We) Do Depends on What They (We) Know (Paradigm 
3) 
 
5.1 The Place of Knowledge in Management 
Our  story  could  end  here.  But,  there  is  the  promise  of  another  perspective, 
which brings together the previous ones while allowing us to see how these two 
can be further help us to see CSR in fact as a still larger conceptual challenge. 
The  third  paradigm  is  ‘The  Knowledge  Paradigm’.  It  aims  to  capture  the 
particular challenges that management faces when confronted with decision-
making challenges in a global market, which is characterized by a great degree 
of uncertainty and risk. This paradigm opens up a new perspective on the way 
that management engages on a day-to-day basis in the negotiation of short-term 
and  long-term  perspectives  in  a  context,  that  is  both  highly  artificially 
constructed with view to the financial instruments, which management operates 
with,  but  it  is  also  deeply  embedded  in  an  evolving  transnational  political 
economy.  This  context  is,  on  the  one  hand,  marked  by  a  radical  decline  in 
publicly available funding for central infrastructure needs – a decline recently 
aggravated by the draw of these funds from seriously undercapitalised banks 
involved in CDOs and other mortgage securitization instruments. On the other 
hand,  this  context  is  undergoing  dramatic  transformations  with  regard  to  its 
longstanding  forms  of  political-legal  regulation  and  market  governance.  As 
domestic  welfare  states  are  continuing  to  struggle  with  the  aftermath  and 
development prospects of privatisation and deregulation politics since the late 
1970s, Western nations have meanwhile been active in shaping the emerging 
economies in the East and the South. The Development Agenda as pursued by 
the World Bank, gives an impressive testimony of the changing focus of its 
policies.
83 
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From Individuals to Organizations to Networks? From Industrial Captains to 
Managerial Revolutionaries to the ‘End’ or ‘Future’ of Management? While 
many  might  agree,  in  theory  and  practice,  that  the  successful  operation  of 
business of such highly volatile and risky, transnational markets continues to 
depend crucially on the persons behind the wheel, the modes of management 
are a matter of deep concern.
84 At the same time, organizational sociologists 
and management theorists are pointing to the amorphous status of knowledge as 
a  subject  of  scientific  assessment  and  strategic  exploitation:  as  knowledge 
begins to both transform and constantly reshape the global economy, the need 
arises  for  a  sophisticated  conceptual  apparatus  to  assess  this  development. 
Needed  are  economics  of  knowledge
85  as  well  as  a  theory  of  knowledge 
management  that  does  not  isolate  business  knowledge  from  questions  of 
governance under conditions of uncertainty.
86  
 
As global companies struggle to maintain their position in the market, the need 
to transnationalize management becomes crucially felt. With the biggest U.S. 
multinationals either still being 95 percent run by Americans and/or losing its 
trained  and  groomed  foreigners  to  aggressively  poaching  emerging  markets 
firms, the issues surrounding a volatile ‘market for management’ tend to eclipse 
the  important  questions  regarding  the  transformation  of  management  today. 
What  does  management  need  to  know?  How  is  that  information  generated, 
processed and utilized? How is that information turned into quality knowledge 
that informs corporate management today? How have the issues arising from a 
transformation  of  global  markets  identified  above  –  first,  the  arrival  of  the 
emerging economies’ actors on the scene and, second, the erosion of financial 
markets  and  the  need  to  revisit  the  foundations  of  the  much-hailed 
financialisation  of  corporate  governance  –  begun  to  inform  the  scope  of 
management responsibility? 
 
Against  this  background,  we  must  assess  the  emerging  challenges  to  our 
traditional  concepts  of  a  company’s  responsibilities  from  a  different  angle. 
Corporate  Social  Responsibility  [CSR]  is  today  on  the  agenda  of  business 
leaders, policy makers and activists because it relates to questions of regulating 
corporate behaviour in a time where it has become a formidable challenge to 
identify what it is that a company does – admittedly a necessary prerequisite for 
any proposal of how companies should be regulated, to whom they owe which 
kind  of  responsibilities.  Where  companies  are  invested  in  domestic  and 
transnational infrastructure provision projects pertaining to telecommunications, 
road construction, health care and old age care provision, energy services and 
urban development, among others, their identification as ‘private’ actors seems 
increasingly inadequate. There is certainly much more to that: the distinction 
between public and private has its roots in the liberal theory of contract law,   18 
that has for the longest time been drawing a line between an allegedly ‘private’ 
business agreement between two parties and a publicly enacted statute setting 
forth an enforceable set of rights and obligations.
87 Of course, we know that 
even such a distinction can only hold where we fail to recognize that allegedly 
private  agreements  are  embedded  in  a  legally  constructed  system  of  rights 
allocation.
88 The same holds true for our assessment of the corporation: if we 
look beyond the business corporation as an economic actor, we recognize that it 
is at home in two worlds: besides its emergence as an economic entity, its other 
nature is legal.
89 Here, we see that a company exists by grace of the law that 
called  it  into  being.  This  observation  is  an  important  starting  point  for  any 
assessment of a company’s responsibilities. Recognizing that a company is a 
legal construct, it becomes possible to ask and to answer questions regarding its 
nature, goals, and eventual limitations with respect to its double-nature.  
 
But, it can be said that the continuing contestation of the business corporation’s 
‘responsibilities’ stems from the insight that the recognition of the legal nature 
of the firm does not resolve the normative questions arising out of the reality of 
the firm. The challenge facing all attempts at designing a comprehensive and 
effective  CSR  strategy  today  results  from  the  fact  that  neither  of  these 
reconstructions  offers  much  of  a  guidance  here:  the  myriad  contexts  and 
markets  in  which  companies  operate  today,  the  host  of  different  societal 
functions,  domestically  and  transnationally,  which  are  driven  deeply  by  the 
powerful transformations of today’s Western societies, constitute a dramatically 
changed environment for business corporations. In the second half of the 20
th 
century, we had only slowly begun to conceptualise the changing governance 
forms for corporate entities as companies began  to assume an ever-growing 
amount  of  formerly  public  functions.  In  many  ways,  the  experiences  of 
corporate governance reform were still very much embedded in a domestic, 
nation-state  framework  of  market  regulation.  Even  with  a  dramatic  rise  of 
privatisation of virtually all sectors of public function, corporate regulation was 
still  conceived  of  as  occurring  within  a  constellation  made  up  of  company, 
taxation  and  securities  regulation  on  the  one  hand,  and  social  welfare  and 
labour/employment  regulation  on  the  other.  With  the  winds  of  globalisation 
blowing  hard  and  cold  over  the  last  few  decades,  the  nation-state  has 
increasingly lost its pivotal role as market regulator. As firms began spanning 
their  activities  across  the  globe,  the  state  has  been  at  odds  in  effectively 
governing this development.
90 On the other side, from the perspective of many 
emerging  market  governments,  it  is  their  insatiable  infrastructure  needs  that 
companies are lining up to satisfy. Companies such as CISCO and GM are 
offering  governments  a  comprehensive  infrastructure  development  program, 
along  with  the  promise  of  themselves  building  some  or  even  all  of  it.
91 
Meanwhile, the firm itself has been the site of true organizational innovation.   19 
As  companies  such  as  IBM  are  promoting  the  concept  of  the  ‘globally 
integrated enterprise’, we are seeing the ‘network society’
92 in action. Moving 
jobs  and  capacities,  human  and  financial,  around  the  globe,  according  to 
identified  needs  and  promises  of  growth,  GIEs  today  assume  myriad 
organizational forms, that fundamentally challenge concepts of legal regulation. 
 
All these changes occur without or outside of the law, it appears, as it is no 
longer clear whether the self-governing normative regimes that structure global 
corporate activity are attached to a particular state. It is against this background, 
that  we  have  to  reconsider  a  conceptual  approach  that  associates  legal  and 
political regulation with the state, while continuing to position the corporation 
in an ambiguously private sphere of self-regulation. 
 
5.2  The  Corporation  as  State:  –  Corporate  Social  Responsibility  in  the 
Knowledge Society 
In the knowledge society, the main protagonists are the post-modern state and 
the  business  corporation.  Both  actors  occupy  a  central  and  yet  highly 
ambivalent  place  within  an  increasingly  complex,  transnational  regulatory 
space. The parallel observations on the state and the corporation are inspiring a 
historical-theoretical  inquiry  into  the  trajectories  that  sociologists  have  been 
tracing from the late 18
th century into the present with regard to the notions, 
concepts and understandings of ‘society’. The idea of society here functions as 
a backdrop for a host of contentions as to the nature and goals of political, legal, 
state (societal) order. Emerging with the 19
th century, such ordering paradigms 
provided for an increasingly eminent role of the ‘state’ within the architectural 
imagination.  Today,  in  light  of  the  state’s  changing  role  in  the  growingly 
interconnected, transnational regulatory landscape, the very  idea of ‘society’ 
begins to forcefully contest a number of the state’s formerly held institutional 
and normative claims.  
 
Any attempt to unpack the concept of society and, with it, of market, occurs 
against the background of far-reaching transformations of state-market relations 
in the second half of the 20
th century. The impact of these transformations are 
reflected in the privatization and post-privatization debates from the late 1970s 
to the early to mid-1990s after the Fall of the Berlin Wall that were oriented 
towards a powerful reassertion of liberal ideas of freedom, which went hand in 
hand with a dramatically reduced influence of the state. Such conceptualizations 
occurred  alongside  an  ever  further  reaching  degree  of  privatization  and 
outsourcing  of  public  services,  which  in  turn  placed  enormous  pressure  on 
traditional legal instruments including concepts of the administrative act and 
contract.
93 
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With a dramatic reconfiguration of public and private governance modes at the 
end of the 20
th century Western Welfare State arises an urgent need to reassess 
the foundations on which our concepts of legal governance have come to rest.
94 
The  case  of  the  business  corporation,  studied  through  the  paradigm  of  the 
transnational  knowledge  society,  promises  to  offer  rich  insights  into  the 
foundations  and  directions  of  these  ongoing  changes  precisely  because  the 
traditionally privately conceived firm has been assuming such a central place in 
the transformation of society from public to private ordering. Whereas public 
governance at the outset of the 21
st century is being described today by formulas 
ranging from the ‘enabling’ or ‘moderating state’ to the ‘risk’, or ‘knowledge 
society’,  modern  corporate  governance  in  many  ways  resembles  this 
fundamental concern with the transformation of regulation. The defining mark 
of contemporary governance is its radical dependency on dispersed, fragmented 
societal knowledge. As political scientists, sociologists and legal scholars alike 
are engaging in a theoretical-historical assessment of the regulatory prospects 
after the decline of the Western Welfare State, the question what might succeed 
the state as a central reference point within a decentralized knowledge society. 
 
A  parallel  challenge  can  be  discerned  with  regard  to  the  large  business 
corporation, which has in many ways been assuming formerly public functions. 
No  wonder,  then,  that  the  debate  among  corporate  lawyers,  activists, 
philosophers and social scientists over ‘corporate social responsibility’ [CSR] 
continues  with  no  end  in  sight.
95  Seen  through  the  sociological  lens  of  the 
knowledge  society,  CSR  functions  as  a  powerful  magnifying  glass  through 
which  we  gain  a  clearer  view  not  only  on  the  wide-ranging  concerns  over 
management  power  in  today’s  large  corporations,  but  also  on  the  parallels 
between  the  information  and  knowledge  generation  and  administration 
challenges in both firms and contemporary governments. Succeeding an early 
20
th  century  pluralist  formulation  of  corporate  conflicts  that  focused  on  the 
opposed interests of owners, employees and creditors within and around the 
business  corporation,  an  adequate  conceptualization  of  CSR  must  begin  to 
incorporate and internalize a radically more complex perspective on corporate 
governance.  A  thus  more  promising  concept  of  CSR  would  thus  suggest 
focusing on the different fields in which the company exerts itself. Such ‘fields’ 
may  be  identified  through  a  regulatory  lens
96  or  by  identifying  the  ‘things 
companies  do’  and ‘why’.
97  Based  on  an  approach  that  seeks  to  integrate  a 
sociological theory of society into the identification of the content and scope of 
the corporation’s various responsibilities one might gain a better understanding 
of the nature of the corporation in that society. 
 
Where traditional CSR concepts are often conceptualized in opposition against 
something that had been taken as the dominant and exclusive definition of the   21 
corporation (as profit maximizer)
98, the here-proposed CSR approach is likely 
to  provide  an  analysis  of  the  way  in  which  the  corporation’s  economic 
performance, embedded in a more comprehensive assessment of the different 
functions the corporation assumes in society, forms part of the corporation’s 
role in different social systems. As the corporation passes through the three 
paradigms, CSR in turn can no longer be understood as the counter program or, 
add-on to corporate governance
99, but must be seen as a lens through which to 
study the reconceptualization of corporate governance. From this perspective, 
the parallels between the early 21
st century state and the contemporary business 
corporation can help us understand the challenges that face both concepts in 
light of a complex, transnational knowledge society. The state in a functionally 
differentiated society has been described as the evolving institutionalization of 
the  political  system,  which  is  merely  one  of  several  communications  taking 
place in society. In turn, the corporation can be seen as being determined by the 
processes of functional differentiation of the economic system. This observation 
has been used in fact to sketch a radically expanded, more complex concept of 
the  corporation  than  would  have  been  possible  under  either  the  industrial-
organizational or the financial paradigm.
100 As the contours of the knowledge 
society  and  the  actors,  actants
101  and  networks  associated  with  it  become 
increasingly clear, the concept of the corporation evolves at breathtaking speed 
and with daunting complexity. Mirroring the blurring and erosion of its physical 
and legal boundaries, the corporation’s nature is once again seemingly beyond 
grasp.  The  persistently  growing  sophistication  of  organizational  and 
management theory allows us at least to better appreciate the task. Building on 
theories of the innovative firm
102 in the context of an expanding understanding 
of the knowledge society is likely to provide us with a more adequate concept 
of the corporation today. 
 
What  is  the  Knowledge  Society?  Its  defining  marks  can  be  seen  in  the 
overriding, crucial role, which is played by the generation, dissemination and 
application  of  knowledge  –  as  opposed  to  mere  information.  Following  a 
distinction  introduced  by  Joel  Mokyr,  the  difference  between  propositional 
knowledge  (describing  existing  constellations)  and  prescriptive  knowledge 
(applied with the goal of shaping outcomes)
103 matters because while the basis 
of the former grows, the latter is part of a much more complex institutional 
framework. Knowledge gathered, developed and assessed for future-oriented 
development becomes embedded in a dramatically transformed environment, 
governed – above all – by conditions of complexity and uncertainty.
104 To the 
degree  that  it  has  been  become  increasingly  difficult  to  clearly  associate  a 
particular legislative, regulatory initiative with one or the other political partisan 
camp,  former  invocations  or  contestations  of  redistribution  in  the  name  of 
‘social  justice’  or  ‘freedom’  ring  today  strangely  faint.  In  a  fast  evolving   22 
context  of  a  globally  merging  market  and  knowledge  society  a 
reconceptualization  of  public  and  private  forms  of  governance  becomes 
necessary,  but  the  orientation  points  are  hard  to  identify.  In  contrast  to  the 
depictions  rendered  by  Weber  or  Polanyi,  we  are  urged  to  understand  the 
boundaries between politics and society as having been artificially drawn with 
reference  to  historically  evolved  patterns  of  institutional  development  and 
depicted  as  political  institutions  on  the  one  hand,  market  institutions  on  the 
other: patterns that have meanwhile come to seem extremely blurry, as both 
political  and  ‘private’  actors  such  as  non-governmental  organizations, 
corporations, collectives and individuals operate under conditions of extreme 
uncertainty  can  hardly  be  depicted  through  references  to  either  ‘public’  or 
‘private’, ‘political’ or ‘market’.
105 
 
Governments and corporations alike are dependent on increasingly fragmented, 
societal knowledge, which leads to an important reconfiguration of the relations 
between  the  different  actors  within  and  outside  of  their  organizational 
boundaries.
106 As sociologists describe the state as the emblem of the political 
system  in  a  functionally  differentiated  society  without  centre  or  pinnacle 
(Luhmann),  we  see  this  society  emerging  as  a  society  that  is  complex  and 
marked by ‘a multiplicity of independent and parallel regulations’.
107 The state, 
in  its  dependence  on  constantly  updated  information,  is  at  the  same  time 
implicated  in  the  production  of  that  very  information  by  creating  rules  and 
facilitating institutional growth for knowledge production and dissemination
108, 
which raises again far-reaching legitimacy problems, that democratic and legal 




Meanwhile,  corporations,  like  other  societal  actors  involved  in  market 
identification,  creation  and  consolidation,  in  investment  and  redistribution 
activities as well as in R&D and ‘knowledge management’
110, face pressing 
governance  challenges  that  in  many  ways  mirror  those  of  contemporary 
political  governing  bodies.
111  The  dependence  of  management  on  expert 
knowledge, which is generated and communicated both in- and outside of the 
firm, has grown in correlation with the expanding reach of business activities 
and their impact. As in other areas of law, the notion of the ‘expert’ has itself 
come  under  increased  scrutiny.  In  corporate  law,  certainly,  long-standing 
attempts to give workers a voice have since begun to inform important demands 
for more diversity in the boardroom, in particular with regard to gender and 
race.
112 With governments and corporations as knowledge actors, producers and 
consumers, the pressure on law to facilitate and to enable these processes has 
exponentially  grown.  Not  adequately  captured  as  being  situated  in  an  either 
exclusively public or private sphere, ‘political’, ‘private’, corporate actors are   23 
both authors and receivers of the rules that govern their behaviour. While this 
new  view  on  the  embeddedness  of  societal  activity  in  a  decentralized,  de-
territorialized and de-hierarchized knowledge society suggests a paradigmatic 
move beyond distinctions based on institutional manifestation (‘state’/’market’) 
or political, normative demarcation (‘public’/ ‘private’)
113, the place to ask the 
original CSR questions becomes increasingly elusive.
114 These questions must 
turn to ‘culture’
115 and to the corporation’s place and nature in the ‘coming 
society’
116 just as the inquiry into the nature of the state must reach beyond the 
narrow choice between the state’s waning or ‘returning’.
117 This is the challenge 
of corporate governance in the knowledge society. 
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